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What I have to offer here is not so much a paper as some scraps of paper. These
represent, on the whole, the result of enquiries on which I have embarked at various
times, but which I have not pursued rigorously to their appropriate conclusions. Nor
does it now seem likely that I shall ever do so. To some extent, therefore, what I am
presenting is an agenda of unfinished business, in the hope that some of the themes I
have partially discussed will seem to others to be worth taking further. To this I must
add that, even if this were a paper rather than a scrapbook, it would still be an
imperfectly structured and incomplete paper. I shall present, to some extent, the
beginning of the story and the end – though I shall, perversely, reverse their
chronological order. The middle, however, will be all but completely missing. This is
because my explorations, such as they have been, have never taken me beyond the
threshold of Bentham’s Scotch Reform writings, which ought clearly to constitute the
missing part of the story, falling as they do in that middle ground between the
Bentham of the radical Enlightenment and the Bentham of philosophical radicalism.
One more preliminary point before I begin – at the end.1 One reason for raising
this subject at all is, I suggest, that there is something of a paradox to be considered.
Bentham was, like Elizabeth I, ‘mere English’ – and he has always seemed to me to
be, if not representatively, at all events essentially English in many of his
characteristics. Yet it is a striking fact that many of the most important relationships
in his life were with Scotsmen. I will not labour the case of John Lind, beyond
pointing out that Lind was definitely of Scots extraction, his grandfather Adam Lind
being, in this branch of the family, the one who took the high road that led so may
Scots of the eighteenth century into England. George Wilson, however, to whom or at
least to whose nudging, we owe the 1789 publication of An Introduction to the
Principles of Morals and Legislation, was wholly Scots, though he pursued – like a
number of his contemporary fellow-countrymen – his legal career in England. (One of
1 For the relationships mentioned in the ensuing paragraph see esp. The Correspondence of Jeremy
Bentham, vols. i-vii, Oxford, 1968-1988 (The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham), as indexes.
Hereafter Correspondence (CW).
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those other Scots, it is worth noting, was also significant for Bentham – Lord
Mansfield). And in the case of James Anderson, at a slightly later date, we have a
Scot who was predominantly active north of the Border. This is by no means the
whole story – a comprehensive catalogue of such contacts would have to include the
close relationship between both Bentham brothers and the Fordyce family. For present
purposes, however, it is more important to take note of the fact that, at a critical point
in the emergence of Benthamism a key if problematic part was played by James Mill
– that superb specimen (as I have called him elsewhere) of ‘the unspeakable Scot’.
To end that part of my preliminaries with Mill provides an apt cue for the first
more substantial part of my discussion, not just because of his nationality but because
he represents, at least for a few years, the prolongation of philosophical radicalism
after Bentham’s death. As I have said, I am beginning at the end – even, indeed,
pursuing the topic beyond the grave, or through the Auto-Icon’s box and out at the
back. The theme I have in mind is the Scottish dimension of Benthamite utilitarianism.
This is not meant to raise again – though I shall certainly have to refer to it later –
something I have tried to deal with.2 I am not, that is to say, concerned here to analyse
the relationship between the proto-sociology and philosophical history of the Scottish
Enlightenment and the doctrines of what became known as philosophical radicalism.
What I have in view is less familiar but seems to merit some attention. Two Scots
played crucial parts in the immediately posthumous dissemination of Bentham’s ideas;
and it is with William Tait and John Hill Burton that I want to deal briefly here.3
Tait’s Edinburgh Magazine must, I think, be regarded as a vehicle of some
importance in that process of dissemination. That, among other things, its pages
carried the first published version of John Bowring’s Memoirs of Bentham is a fact of
which the significance and value may be variously estimated. More generally, there is
at least a minor piece of research to be undertaken by someone willing to scan and
analyse the contents of the magazine in the first decade or two after 1832. More
important, of course, is the fact that it was Tait, an Edinburgh bookseller, who
undertook the not inconsiderable burden – and risk – of publishing the first (and even
now the most extensive if not comprehensive collection of Bentham’s writings. No
2 Cf. J.H. Burns, ‘The Light of Reason: Philosophical History in the two Mills’, in ed. J. M. Robson &
M. Laine, James and John Stuart Mill: Papers of the Centenary Conference (Toronto & Buffalo, 1976),
pp. 3-20. See also J.H. Burns, ‘Scottish philosophy and the science of legislation’, in Royal Society of
Edinburgh Occasional Papers, vol 2 (1985), pp. 11-29.
3 For Tait (1793-1864) see DNB.
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doubt one might sourly comment that Edinburgh’s outstanding record in printing and
publishing makes the repellent format and typography of that edition all the more
deplorable. Yet in the end what mattered – and matters – is that Tait did indeed
publish the eleven formidable volumes. If this achieved nothing else, it firmly – and
dauntingly – established the sheer scale of what Bentham had achieved in the half-
century and more that ended with his death. The edition may, to be sure, have done
more to confirm what were already quite strong prejudices against Bentham’s ideas
(and his prose style) than to achieve what was presumably Tait’s aim – to make
Bentham’s thought more widely available and more generally accepted. However that
may be, we should not forget that without Tait’s enterprise most of Bentham’s works
– even when they existed in previously published editions – would have ceased to be
available in English very soon after his death. Other publishers might have done the
same, or at least done something; but I strongly suspect that they would not.
It is also true, of course, that what we conventionally call ‘the Bowring edition’
would not have been possible without the devoted – and at times almost distracted –
labours of a small group of Benthamites. And it is not, I hope, to underrate the
achievements of such industrious disciples as Richard Doane and Southwood Smith to
say that the most important part here was played by John Hill Burton, the future
Historiographer Royal of Scotland.4 Burton’s name could, I suppose, be added to
those of James Mill and George Grote in the paradoxical list of those who in some
measure followed the profoundly ahistorical – even anti-historical – Bentham and yet
are best remembered for their historical writings. Nor can we argue, I think, that
Burton’s seven-volume History of Scotland (1867-70) betrays much of the influence
of Benthamism – or for that matter of the Enlightened philosophical historiography
that Mill, in his History of British India, had found compatible with his
utilitarianism. Contemporary critics found Burton as an historian ‘reticent ... calm ... .
dispassionate’: they saw a striking contrast with J. A. Froude’s ‘glowing eulogiums ...
and ... bitter one-sided pictures’. A writer in the Revue des deux mondes found Burton
‘érudit avec la sagacité d’un habile avocat, historien avec la méthode precise du
jurisconsult’.5 Both the critics and the author himself, however, seem to have seen his
4 On Burton (1809-81), see DNB, together with the Memoir by his widow in the posthumous edition of
The Book-Hunter, Edinburgh and London, 1882.
5 Citations from the preliminary pages of J.H. Burton, The History of Scotland, from Agricola’s
Invasion to the Extinction of the Last Jacobite Invasion, 8 vols, Edinburgh and London, 1905. The
English phrases were used by reviewers in Blackwood’s Magazine and in the Standard.
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work as exemplifying ‘the painstaking research of the nineteenth century’ rather than
the philosophical history of the eighteenth. At an early point in the work he contrasts
‘an inductive history, sufficient to fill up a blank in written history’ with what he
sarcastically dismisses as ‘fables’ which ‘profess to be born of the philosophy’ and
‘are not less unreal than the old fables, and only much less amusing’.6 It may indeed
be worth considering – though I must leave the point aside here – whether this might,
after all, be the kind of history a Benthamite might think it reasonable to write, if
history must indeed be written.
It is, however, with earlier aspects of Burton’s work that I am concerned more
directly here. The Memoir written by his wife soon after his death certainly does not
treat his editorial work on Bentham as a major aspect of his activity and achievement.
It appears there more or less as a spare-time occupation; but at least one crucial fact is
put on record – namely, that Burton was ‘editor, along with Dr (afterwards Sir
John)’.7 The importance of this has, I think, been less than fully recognised. The truth
is that even the joint editorship that has occasionally won recognition in library
catalogues and elsewhere does less than justice to Burton’s contribution. The more the
matter is investigated the clearer it becomes that Burton, not Bowring, was the
effectively responsible editor. That may sound more like an accusation than an
accolade. The ‘Bowring edition’ has attracted a good deal of wholly justifiable
adverse criticism, not to say abuse. Yet, as one who has certainly not been backward
in such critical attacks, I must confess to some degree of belated compunction. Even
before I fled from the general editorship of the Bentham Project I had begun to feel at
least grudging respect for anyone who could achieve what was achieved within a
dozen years of Bentham’s death. But such respect is surely due more to Burton than to
Bowring; for it seems clear that, apart from the indispensable but execrable Memoirs,
Bowring’s direct contribution was pretty limited. For that matter, even the charge of
having notoriously omitted – even suppressed – Bentham’s extensive and peculiar
writings on religion and the church – sometimes ascribed to Bowring’s
circumspection must be regarded as (to use an aptly Scottish verdict) not proven. The
probability is that the edition was cut short for the eminently respectable reason that
the money to publish more was not to be found; and such a decision would
presumably have been taken in Edinburgh, where the financial shoe pinched. Again,
6 History of Scotland (8 vols; Edinburgh & London, 1905), vol. 1, 78-9.
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as I have already recalled, the edition was in the end the work of quite a few hands –
some of which, like those of John Stuart Mill, had done their work long before Tait’s
edition was in prospect. In the end, however, it does seem fair to claim that Burton’s
contribution was decisively important, not least in what remains one of the edition’s
most valuable features – the elaborate analytical index to the whole collection. And
Burton’s own Benthamiana must surely have had many more readers than ‘the greater
work’ to which, as Burton’s widow remarked, it was intended to be ‘a precursor’.8
Nor should we see Burton simply as someone who, having undertaken this work
at a relatively early stage in his career, turned as soon as possible in the more
congenial directions that took him – in his major historical work – far away from the
world of Benthamiana. His first substantial independent work was neither Benthamic
nor, strictly, historical; and yet his Life and Correspondence of David Hume (1846)
may surely be regarded as lying closer to the world of Jeremy Bentham than to the
painstaking History of Scotland.9 Burton’s book was the first major work of the kind,
and it represents a moment of some importance in the development of Hume studies.
Over a century later, writing on Hume for the 1955 edition of Chambers’s
Encyclopædia, John Laird found Burton’s book still worth consulting and only partly
superseded by the work of J. Y. T. Greig.10 Now, given Hume’s central significance
for the Scottish Enlightenment as a whole, this may well suggest that we should see
John Hill Burton not only as an important figure in the conservation and
dissemination of the Benthamic texts, but also as one channel whereby the work of
perhaps the greatest philosopher of the eighteenth century was transmitted to the
Victorian age. There, for the moment, I leave this part of my subject, adding only that,
as I have tried to suggest, the subject of Scottish Benthamism might well repay fuller
investigation.
In any case, David Hume serves to carry me conveniently from the end to the
beginning of my theme; for I want now to consider the subject of ‘Bentham and the
Scots’ in the context of the earliest phases in his long career. The first of the two
aspects I shall try to examine is the relationship between Bentham’s emerging and
developing thought in the 1770s and 1780s on the one hand and, on the other, the
7 The Book-Hunter, 1882 edn, p. xlvii.
8 See J.H. Burton, Benthamiana; or, Select Extracts from the Works of Jeremy Bentham, Edinburgh,
1843; Burton, Book-Hunter, p. xlvii.
9 J.H. Burton, Life and Correspondence of David Hume, 2 vols, Edinburgh, 184.
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ideas associated with the Scottish Enlightenment; and much of what I say will be a
concentrated version of the 1783 paper already mentioned (cf. n. 2 above).
Bentham himself acknowledged a considerable debt to Hume in regard to the
earliest formative steps in his intellectual development. The fundamental notion of
utility itself as the essential criterion to be applied in the moral sciences; the critique
of conventional natural-law thinking; the demolition of the social contract – these
constitute perhaps the greatest part of that indebtedness. And they are certainly
enough to indicate the importance of the debt. However, if Bentham – like Kant in
another context – was ‘awakened from his dogmatic slumbers’ by reading Hume –
and a well-known footnote in A Fragment on Government makes that a not
inappropriate comparison – the world he came to see through the eyes thus opened
was not in the end a Humean world 11 Even the term ‘utility’ and the cognate
‘principle of utility’ came to seem in some ways ill-chosen for Bentham’s purposes;
and at the end of his life, in the Deontology and related manuscripts, he was at least as
much concerned to criticise Hume as to praise him. The shorthand notes on Hume’s
theory of the virtues, deciphered by Amnon Goldworth, are especially interesting
evidence here.12 Long before that, however, as early as the second chapter of An
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Bentham had tried and
found wanting the whole ‘moral sense’ basis of the philosophy he found in Hume -
and which he would have found also in such other figures of the Scottish
Enlightenment as Adam Smith.13
Yet, even in a cursory discussion like this, the Bentham-Hume relationship
cannot be left there, simply as a matter of early enthusiasm followed by fairly rapid
disenchantment. It has, for one thing, been generally recognised that the dismissal of
alternative ethical theories in the Introduction to the Principles is as superficial as it is
brash; and in any case, however unacceptable Bentham found the notion of a moral
sense, his indebtedness to Hume remained profound. If we go back to the 1770s,
when Bentham was writing the Comment on the Commentaries and the derivative
10 Chambers’s Encyclopaedia, 15 vols, London, 1955. See also J.Y.T. Greig, David Hume, Oxford,
1931, and The Letters of David Hume, 2 vols, ed. J.Y.T. Greig, Oxford, 1932.
11 A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment of Government, ed. J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart,
Oxford, 1970 (The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham), hereafter Comment (CW), pp. 439-40n.
12 Deontology together with a Table of the Springs of Action and Article on Utilitarianism, ed. Amnon
Goldworth, Oxford, 1983, (CW), Appendix C, pp. 345-63. Hereafter Deontology (CW).
13 IPML (CW),p. 26n. With Smith’s political economy, of course, Bentham’s relationship was very
different; but that is not germane here, and I leave it to more expert hands.
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Fragment on Government, bearing in mind that this was still very much the period
when he was defining his intellectual position and declaring his intellectual loyalties,
we shall find indications of important issues. There is, for instance, the contempt with
which Bentham rejects the ‘common sense’ rejoinder to Hume’s sceptical reasoning –
his satire against the ‘trio of Scotch Doctors’ – James Beattie, Thomas Reid, and
James Oswald – who ‘won’t be argued with’, who ‘cut everything short with the
sword of common sense’.14 Now it was, of course and above all, Hume’s ‘infidelity’
that aroused such opposition; and it is reasonable to conclude that, for Bentham,
Hume stood with Voltaire and with Gibbon at the head of the forces of light against
the forces of darkness. This has a further effect on his reaction to Scottish ideas at this
period. It is true that he can, up to a point, see William Robertson as embodying a
concept of history, a way of envisaging the past, which can be advantageously
contrasted with Blackstone’s prejudices ‘in favour of antiquity’. Yet Robertson was
himself ‘a clerical historian’, held back by the religious beliefs he professed. The
candour of historical and philosophical investigation was constantly apt to meet with
‘some formal dogma which he dare not thwart for fear either of himself or of the
world’.15
Yet it would not be quite correct to conclude that Hume (together with Smith in
respect of political economy, and subject to some reservations) accounts for the whole
of Bentham’s indebtedness to Scottish Enlightenment thinking. There is at least one
lesser but not negligible figure to be reckoned with – Henry Home, Lord Kames
(1696-1782). It is certainly the case that Bentham refers approvingly to Kames on
several occasions in his early writings (and we need not attach too much significance
to the fact the consistently misspelt the name as ‘Keymis’). Kames’s Historical Law
Tracts (1758) do seem to have made a favourable impression on Bentham, at least as
an example (the work of Daines Barrington south of the Border would have been
another) of how historical learning might be applied in jurisprudence more
beneficially than ‘poor Blackstone’ had achieved.16 The library of University College
London has Bentham’s marked copy of the book; but it has to be said that this
evidence suggests that, when Bentham was not using ‘Keymis’ as a stick with which
to beat Blackstone, his admiration fell some way short of idolatry. He was, to be sure,
14 Comment (CW), pp. 337-8 & nn.
15 Ibid., pp. 317-18.
16 H. Home, Lord Kames, Historical Law Tracts, 2 vols, Edinburgh, 1758.
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ready to forgive in Kames what he censured in Robertson. ‘The wanderings of an
imagination, warmed by a zeal for virtue’, he noted, ‘will always be pardonable: but’,
he adds at once, ‘I do not see of what use rhetorical exclamations against experience
can be in a work like this of the didactic kind’. The occasion of this austere if kindly
reproof is worth pausing over. Kames had claimed that the dread of punishment,
‘when the result of atrocious and unnatural Crimes, is often a tremenduous [sic]
punishment far exceeding all that has been invented by Man’. This will not do for
Bentham, who makes his case against it by referring to the case of Robert-François
Damiens, executed in 1757 for attempting to assassinate Louis XV:
Damiens was guilty of an atrocious crime; but I cannot think that any
body but his Lordship, nor even his Lordship himself upon a second
review can seriously suppose that his misery was greater before the
engines of Torture were applied to his body than at the time of the
application. His shrieks were such as made an impression on the mind of
a bystander from whom I had it not to be obliterated by half a year’s
duration. But I never heard that those shrieks commenced before the
Torture was applied.17
I now turn – though my route will bring me circuitously back to the Scottish
philosophes – to a different aspect of Bentham’s view of matters and men in Scotland.
At several points in his writings in the 1770s and 1780s, he finds occasion to refer to
the constitutional status of Scotland following the Union of 1707. Sometimes his
purpose is only to poke fun at Blackstone – suggesting ironically, for instance, that at
one point in the Commentaries ‘our Author’ seems to envisage Scottish
Presbyterians rising in opposition to measures that would have benefited their fellow-
presbyterians in England. Why? Because the proposed measures, by undermining the
secured status of the Anglican Church in England would tend to subvert the
guarantees given to the Church of Scotland at the time of the Union.18 Elsewhere,
however, Bentham sees the terms of the Union as raising more serious issues of
constitutional jurisprudence.
17 Ibid., pp. 3-4. Bentham’s comments are in the copy in University College London Library, Bentham
Collection 6H2.
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The issue at stake here is the issue of sovereignty, and Bentham’s acceptance of
– or, rather, his insistence upon – the point that a sovereign legislature may properly
be regarded as limited by what he calls ‘express conventions’. One situation in which
this may happen is, Bentham argues, that in which one state has ‘upon terms’
submitted itself to the government of another. This, he evidently supposes, is what
had happened between Scotland and England in 1707. I will not enter into the debate
such an interpretation necessarily prompts; but it is proper to point out, in a paper on
‘Bentham and the Scots’, that it manifestly reflects an Anglocentric view of the
transaction only to be expected of one who was (as I have said) ‘mere English’ – or,
to employ a Scottish rendering, ‘English, poor thing!’ What is more important – and
becomes even more so if a less Anglocentric view is substituted – is that Bentham, at
least when he wrote the Fragment on Government, was prepared to base upon this
view the hypothesis that, under such an arrangement, means could be found of
safeguarding the conditions of the Union without impairing the ordinary sovereignty
of the legislature. What he suggests is that legislative measures that might seem to
affect adversely the conditions guaranteed to the Scottish minority in the United
Kingdom might, after due enactment, be suspended for the period of a year or two,
during which time it would be possible for the Scots to petition against the proposed
law. Petitioning at a certain predetermined level would suffice to invalidate what the
legislature had passed. It is also noteworthy that this is offered as only one possible
way of dealing with a problem Bentham plainly regarded as both important and
soluble.19
None of this, of course, modified Bentham’s distaste, both then and later, for the
concept of ‘fundamental law’. It is interesting to see how this emerges in the Scotch
Reform period – into which I now take my one hesitant step. Writing to Samuel
Romilly in June 1807, Bentham comments on the Memorial submitted by the Scottish
judges on the subject of the reform of legal procedure in Scotland. He expresses his
surprise at finding himself largely in agreement with the substance of what the judges
proposed - the surprise stemming from what he calls ‘the stile of their address to their
constitutional superiors, and the use, or rather abuse, they had attempted to make of
the Act of Union. As John Dinwiddy pointed out in his footnote, Bentham had, in
notes written a couple of months earlier, ‘criticised the Scottish judges for
18 Cf. Comment (CW), pp. 156-7.
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maintaining that some parts of Grenville’s bill contravened the “fundamental”
provisions of the Act of Union: this, Bentham said, was to argue on grounds of right
rather than of utility’.20
Clearly, however, this area of constitutional jurisprudence was, or had been,
more problematic for Bentham than the brisk rejection of ‘fundamental law’ might
suggest. Its problems led him, in Of Laws in General, into an intricate discussion of
what he there called ‘constitutional laws in principem’; and while I do not propose to
enter here into those complexities. It is relevant to note that, at the end of the relevant
passage, Bentham comes back, as it were, to Scotland. To deny ‘all efficacy’ to such
laws, he says, ‘would be going too far’. To do so would entail a series of conclusions
Bentham plainly regarded as inadmissible: ‘it would be as much as to say’ – inter alia
– ‘that the Act of Union has never been anything but a dead letter.’21
What I am suggesting, in the context of this paper, is that the constitutional
relationship between Scotland and England was problematic for Bentham. And I
indicated earlier that this excursus into constitutional theory would bring me back,
circuitously, to Bentham’s relationship with the Scottish Enlightenment. In what will
be, apart from a brief coda, the final part of this paper, I want to develop that point a
little. For one thing, I want to repeat a point made in my 1983 paper, already cited, on
‘Scottish philosophers and the science of legislation’. For Bentham, as for Adam
Smith in his lectures on jurisprudence, to accept the fundamental doctrine of
sovereignty is not to preclude entirely the possibility of a division or distribution of
sovereign power. More important, however, is another aspect of Smith’s
jurisprudence, which seems to bring him closer to Bentham than one might have been
disposed to expect. Both Smith and Bentham – at least the early Bentham – regarded
paternal power and the model of authority to be found in the family as crucially
important for our understanding of the relationship between sovereign and subject.
And this in turn takes us back to an element in Bentham’s thinking in which we may
discern significant affinities with Scottish Enlightened thought, and more specifically
with David Hume. In the end, as we know, Bentham’s theory of sovereignty – at least,
again, his early theory; but it was a theory he never disowned – revolves around the
notion of a habit of obedience. Much of his polemic against Blackstone’s account of
19 Ibid., 490-1 n.
20 Correspondence (CW), vii. pp. 432 & n. 3.
21 Of Laws in General, ed. H.L.A. Hart, Oxford, 1970 (CW), pp. 70-1. Hereafter Of Laws (CW).
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the matter, both in the Fragment on Government and in Of Laws in General, proceeds
on this basis. Now it seems to me – though I have never (I must frankly admit)
subjected the impression to appropriately rigorous analysis and textual exploration –
that the notion that social and political arrangements rest ultimately upon a process of
habituation must, at the very least, have considerable Humean resonance. If this is
true, then perhaps Bentham’s indebtedness to Hume really did penetrate to a deeper
level in his thought than my remarks earlier in this paper might suggest.
In what I have called my coda, I want to invert matters and to ask what can be
said, not about Bentham’s response to the Scottish Enlightenment, but rather about the
reaction of Scottish Enlightened thinkers to Bentham. Even more than the earlier parts
of this paper, this is a theme demanding much more careful and thorough
investigation than I have myself undertaken. Yet one or two points may be worth
making here. On the one hand, if we may regard the conductors of the Edinburgh
Review as second-generation apostles of the Scottish Enlightenment, we do of course
have their response to some parts of Bentham’s work. I limit myself here to the period
nearest to that earlier part of Bentham’s career to which this paper has mainly referred.
The evidence is, of course, to be found in Francis Jeffrey’s 1804 review of the
Dumont Traités de législation (1802); and it may suffice here to make two points.
First, the review was notably unsatisfactory to both Bentham and Dumont at the time.
Three years after it appeared, Bentham was still referring to it as ‘that critique on
Dumont Principes which we were all so discontented with’. Dumont himself, as soon
as he read the article, wrote, with wry irony, ‘I am charmed that the lessons of these
young people have come in time to prevent me from continuing my follies. I only just
wait to read what they say, before I throw all your MSS into the fire’.22 And in our
own time, Biancamaria Fontana has seen Jeffrey’s critique as marking the beginning
of decades of argument between Whigs and Utilitarians as to the appropriate
methodology of the social sciences.23
Yet if there was always – as I believe there was – a gulf between Bentham and
the ‘Scotch philosophers’, it was not quite the ‘great gulf fixed’ between Dives and
22 Dumont to Bentham, April 1804, Correspondence (CW), vii. pp. 266-677. Romilly had told Dumont
that the Traités ‘had been treated [in the Edinburgh Review] with scandalous irreverence’. For
Bentham’s later reference, see his letter to Samuel Bentham of 5 March 1807in ibid., pp. 415-16. For
the Jeffrey’s review, see Edinburgh Review, vol. 4 ( April 1804), pp. 1-26.
23 B. Fontana, Rethinking the Politics of Commercial Society: The Edinburgh Review 1802- 1832,
Cambridge, 1985, p. 160 ff.
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Lazarus. I end with a passage from Dugald Stewart’s Dissertation on the History of
Ethical Philosophy (1815/21):
Mr Bentham’s expressions are somewhat unguarded, when he calls the
Law of Nature “an obscure phantom, which, in the imaginations of those
who go in chase of it, points sometimes to manners, sometimes to laws,
sometimes to what law is, sometimes to what it ought to be”. Nothing,
indeed, can be more exact and judicious than this description, when
restricted to the Law of Nature, as commonly treated of by writers on
Jurisprudence; but if extended to the Law of Nature, as originally
understood by ethical writers, it is impossible to assent to it, without
abandoning all the principles on which the science of morals ultimately
rests. With these obvious, but, in my opinion, very essential limitations,
I perfectly agree with Mr Bentham, in considering an abstract code of
laws as a thing equally unphilosophical in the design, and useless in the
execution.24
And what precisely we are to discern through that Scotch mist I must leave to others
to determine.
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